Quantcast
Channel: Arm Poblachtach na hÉireann – APnaÉ (Irish Republican Army – IRA) – An Sionnach Fionn
Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 73

British Spies In The IRA, Myth Versus Reality

$
0
0
A Volunteer of the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army in a military training camp outside the town of Donegal, Ireland, 21st August 1986
A Volunteer of the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army in a military training camp outside the town of Donegal, Ireland, 21st August 1986

Just a quick heads-up for those who have access to the series “Twentieth Century British History” from the Oxford Journals. A recent edition features an article titled “The Influence of Informers and Agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army Military Strategy and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1976–94” by Thomas Leahy of King’s College, London. In it the researcher pretty much demolishes the myth of the British “super spies” in the ranks of (Provisional) Irish Republican Army. From the introductory abstract:

“This article investigates the impact of British informers and agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) military strategy and British counter-insurgency strategy in Northern Ireland between 1976 and 1994. The importance of this topic was highlighted by revelations in 2003 and 2005 concerning two senior republicans who had both been working for British intelligence for decades. While acknowledging other important factors, various authors believe that these intelligence successes were vital in containing the IRA, and significantly influenced that organization to end its military campaign in the 1990s.

Yet after cross-referencing new interview material primarily with memoirs from various participants in the Northern Ireland conflict, this article reveals that the nature of many rural IRA units, its cellular structure in Belfast, and the isolation of the IRA leadership from the rest of the movement, prevented it from being damaged to any considerable extent by informers and agents.

In fact, by the 1990s the resilience of the IRA was a crucial factor encouraging the British government to include Provisional Republicans in a political settlement. The IRA’s military strength by the 1990s also points towards the prominence of political factors in persuading the IRA to call a ceasefire by 1994. The role of spies in Northern Ireland and the circumstances in which the state permitted negotiations with paramilitaries such as the IRA, are key considerations for those interested in other recent and current conflicts.”

This of course is an argument that I have been making myself since 2011, and can be found in such ASF posts as:

Playing Fantasy Troubles

Fantasy Troubles Part III – Britain’s Superspies!

More Cloak And Dagger Shenanigans In Fantasy Troubles

Fantasy Troubles Part 4

Tolerating The Armed Struggle


Filed under: Cúrsaí Reatha (Current Affairs), Cogaíocht (Warfare), Leabhair (Books), Polaitíocht (Politics), Stair (History) Tagged: An Cogadh Fada (The Long War), Arm Poblachtach na hÉireann - APnaÉ (Irish Republican Army - IRA), Éire (Ireland), Óglaigh na hÉireann - ÓnaÉ (The Irish Volunteers - IV), Ian Hurst / Martin Ingrams, Secret Intelligence Service [SIS - MI6], Security Service [SS - MI5], Thomas Leahy

Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 73

Trending Articles



<script src="https://jsc.adskeeper.com/r/s/rssing.com.1596347.js" async> </script>